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BASEL III: THE FEDERAL RESERVE'S FAILURE TO ADDRESS
THE GOALS OF DODD-FRANK
Dim itriy Kotovt
I.

INTRODUCTION

The U.S. financial crisis of 2008 was primarily caused by the issuance of subprime
mortgages. Lenders were able to issue these loans, with little to no income or asset
2
verification, because banking regulations were lax when it came to mortgage transactions.
This created a "housing bubble," which consisted of residential property that was valued
lower than what borrowers owed on the mortgage. 3 As a result, many borrowers were
"underwater" on their loans and had no choice but to foreclose on their properties because
they could no longer make the minimum payments.4 This result beckons the question: can
more emphasis on the borrower's ability to repay his or her mortgage prevent another
financial crisis?
Dodd-Frank was a response to the lack of banking oversight and has attempted to
answer this question by creating regulations that would prevent lenders from issuing subprime
loans, among other things. The Federal Reserve subsequently passed regulations to address
6
the requirements of Dodd-Frank. To do this, the Federal Reserve substantially adopted the
rules promulgated by the Basel Committee, which are known as the Third Basel Accord or
Basel III. Basel III does not have the force of law, but is rather an important global
framework intended to promote financial growth and resilience in the banking sector. With
over 65% of Americans owning a home with a mortgage attached to it 9, any regulations based
t J.D. Candidate, 2015, Hofstra University School of Law.' See S. SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH
CONG., WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE 24-25 (Apr. 13,

2011), available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/reports
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on Basel III that the Federal Reserve has implemented, must be scrutinized for mortgage
reforms that focus on assessing the borrowers risk through the duration of his or her loan.
The Federal Reserve's implementation of Basel III does not address the purpose of
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank" or "The
Act"), which is to promote financial stability and consumer protection. Basel III does not take
into account public policy encouraging consumer lending. Therefore, for banking regulations
to be effective in promoting financial stability and consumer protection, it is necessary to
modify lending practices to focus more on the borrower's ability to pay through the lifetime
of a loan. By focusing on the borrower's ability to repay the loan, it is possible to resolve
many of the issues that led up to the financial collapse. For example, lenders now have to
ensure a borrower will not assume payments that he or she cannot afford, or use a property as
collateral that cannot cover the full the amount of the loan. 10Basic factors such as these can
go a long way in preventing another financial crisis. Because the financial crisis was fueled
by inadequate collateral used to secure mortgages as well as by lending practices through
which borrowers with insufficient funds were able to obtain loans, it becomes necessary to
review a borrowers risk not only when he or she applies for a loan, but through the lifetime of
the loan. In the wake of the financial collapse of 2008, the United States has sought to create
clearer guidelines for consumers and financial institutions to prevent future financial
instability." In passing Dodd-Frank, Congress aimed legislation at preventing issues such as
subprime lending and deceptive lending practices. 12 The goal of the Act was to promote
financial stability and consumer protection.13 In response to the Act, the Federal Reserve
implemented a series of capital conservation requirements for the banking industry to
follow. 14 These requirements, are designed to keep banks capitalized in times of economic
down-turn and are substantially based on Basel 111.1 Basel III attempts to achieve this result
by setting minimum capital conservation requirements for banks to cover their losses. 16
However, these federal banking regulations fail to address the lack of banking
oversight with regards to lending. Banks continue to have the ability to sell mortgages
originated through the course of business to Government Sponsored Entities, essentially
creating a "revolving door" or liquidity for banks, while continuously increasing the burden
on Government Sponsored Entities, such as Freddie Mac, to purchase loans and carry the
risk.1 Although the risk may have decreased since 2008 due to stricter guidelines for loan
"o See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111 -203, 124 Stat.
1376,768 (2010)
" See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111 -203, 124 Stat. 1376
(2010)
12 See id.
13 Id.

14 See Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory Capital, Implementation of Basel III, Capital Adequacy,
Transition Provisions, Prompt Corrective Action, Standardized Approach for Risk-weighted Assets, Market
Discipline and Disclosure Requirements, Advanced Approaches Risk-Based Capital Rule, and Market Risk
Capital Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 62018-01 (Oct. 11, 2013).
See Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient
Banks and Banking Systems, 1 (2010), availableathttp://bis.org/publ/bcbsl89.pdf.
16 See id.
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originators, the economy as a whole, including the job market, is what influences the
performance of loans.18 Basel III fails to address these concerns because banking institutions
will inevitably sell off their loans to fund new loans, allowing them to meet their capital
conservation requirements.
A potential solution to this problem is bridging the gap between Dodd-Frank and
banking regulations through lending reform, which remains a nationally encouraged activity.
By accepting that banks need to have the ability to lend money while meeting capital
conservation requirements, it is possible to put more emphasis on the lending and riskassessment process to ensure the origination of quality loans. To do this, it is necessary to
examine the current state of banking regulations in the form of Basel III, the cause of the
2008 financial crisis, the method by which Dodd-Frank seeks to promote financial stability
and consumer protection, and the lending process and how it is affected by the new
regulations.

II.

THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2008

The enactment of Basel III, Dodd-Frank, and the subsequent regulations passed by
the Federal Reserve were done in response to the financial crisis of 2008. These regulations
seek to address the underlying causes of the recession in order to ensure financial stability and
consumer protection. For example, one of the leading causes of the financial crisis of 2008
was the mortgage market. 19 Under traditional lending practices, banks lent money to a
homebuyer at a fixed-rate for thirty years. 2 0 The bank kept the mortgage and serviced it until
it was paid off.2 1 However, regulations limited the number of loans a bank could issue
22
because the banks were required to keep a certain amount of capital in reserve.
Banking
institutions sold the loans to other financial institutions and used the profits to issue new loans
to circumvent the regulations. 23 The profits came from origination fees and not long-term
servicing of these mortgages.24
Banks began using a financial instrument known as securitization to make a greater
profit on mortgage sales.2
Securitization is the process by which a financial institution "bundles" a large
number of mortgages together into a pool.26 The financial institutions calculate the amount of
mortgage payments that the pool of borrowers will remit. These securitized mortgages are

1 See S. SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH CONG., WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS:
ANATOMY
OF
A
FINANCIAL
COLLAPSE
24-25
(Apr.
13,
2011),
available
at
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/reports
[hereinafter Anatomy of a Financial
Collapse].
20

See id. at 17.
Id.

21

Id.

'9

22 See id.
23 See id.
24

Id.
25 Id. at 18
26 Id.
27 Id.
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then held by a corporation or a trust created by the financial institution. 2 8 These new bonds,
known as Residential Mortgage Backed Securities (RMBS), are then sold to investors through
a public offering. 29 The investor eams money by holding these bonds and collecting on the
coupon rate, which is generated through the repayment of principal and interest. 30 RMBSs
were originally based off of thirty year fixed-rate mortgages, which were relatively safe and
yielded consistent returns to investors.31 Lenders earned profits by originating these
32
mortgages. Investment banks earned profits by bundling these mortgages into RMBSs and
subsequently selling them.3 3
As a result, the demand for residential mortgage-backed securities increased. 34 To
meet the demand, banks began to lend to high-risk borrowers, which later became known as
subprime borrowers. 3 5 Aside from disregarding the high-risk nature of unqualified borrowers,
36
many banks issued loans with little to no verification of the borrower's income or assets.
Additionally, the banks required little or no down payment and used mortgage instruments
that did not require a borrower to pay down the principal, which is known as a negative
amortization loan.3 At a certain point, the rate associated with subprime mortgages
substantially increased, causing severe financial hardship for the borrower.38 Banks also
disregarded any potential fraud or inaccurate income information provided by borrowers. 3 9 To
sustain the profits financial intuitions were earning and to ensure continued lending, banks
began to issue new mortgage instruments specifically created to increase profits, without
factoring in risk.40
These riskier products were sold to uninformed consumers and, as a result, began to
destabilize the economy. One of the most common instruments used to entice borrowers into
a mortgage was a Hybrid Adjustable Rate Mortgage (ARM). 4 1 An ARM would allow a
borrower to pay a low, fixed rate ("teaser rate") for a specified period of time, typically
ranging from two to five years. 4 2 Once this teaser rate expired, the rates would substantially

28 Id.
29

Id.

30

Id.

31 Id.
32 See id.

33 See id.
34 See id.
35 See id.
[N]oting that Federal Banking Regulators defined subprime borrows as those with one of
the following characteristics: "(1) two or more 30-day delinquencies in the last 12
months or one or more 60-day delinquencies in the past 24 months; (2) a judgment or
foreclosure in the past 24 months; (3) a bankruptcy in the last 5 years; (4) A relatively
high default probability as evidenced by a credit score below 660; or a debt service to
income ratio of 50% or more.
36 Id.

at 19.

37 See id.

38 See id. at 20.
39 See id.
40 See id.
41 Id.
42

at 21.

Id.
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increase.4 3 This left borrowers unprepared to pay much higher interest and principal
payments. 4 Additionally, many of the original payments were known as "interest only," not
requiring borrowers to pay any principal.4 Once the introductory rates expired, borrowers
46
attempted to refinance their mortgages to avoid the higher payments. At some point, they
were no longer able to refinance because they had not paid down any of the principal. This
led to the value of their home being less than the amount they owed, which resulted in default
and foreclosure. 4
Another common tool used by banks was the Home Equity Loan.48 Borrowers were
often enticed by home equity loans because of the additional capital they would receive as
cash. 4 9 This type of loan created liens against the borrower's home for the additional amount
of equity the borrower took as a loan.50 Aside from issuing these loans when the borrower had
little to no equity in their home, many banks originated mortgages which included Home
Equity Loans, which were used as the down payment for the home.5 The resulting loan to
value (LTV) percentage would often be as high as 100%. If the borrower defaulted, the lien
holder would not recover anywhere near the full amount of the debt owed.52
Some borrowers took advantage of the Alt-A loan, or the more extreme version
known as the stated income loan. These loans essentially allowed banks to issue loans with
limited or no documentation of a borrower's income or assets.54 Alt-A loans also allowed a
borrower to finance 100% of the mortgage through a loan. Banks would not substantiate any
of the stated income or assets, which borrowers typically inflated to ensure they would qualify
for a loan. With borrowers unaware of the consequences, and banks relying on the resilience
of the real estate market, the economy continued to lose traction.
The final outcome was a push towards speed and volume by banking institutions to
issue these subprime loans so that they may be securitized for investment purposes. Banks
would make their profits, sell the loans to investment banks, which would earn money
through securitization, and they would then issue them to the public.58 These subprime
lending practices led to defaults, foreclosures, and financial ruin.59 As a result, investors in
RMBSs were no longer making money, and the entire financial structure began to unravel.o

43 See id.
4 See id.
45 See id. at 22.
46 See id.

47 See id. at 22.
48 Id. at 23.
49 See id.
5o See id.
5 See id.
52 See id.

53 Id. at 24.
54 See id.

See id.
6 See id. at 24-25.

See id.
See id.
59 See id.
6o See id.
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Because the consumer was a necessary party to this outcome, it became necessary not only to
consider financial stability, but also consumer protection.
III.

BASEL III

The Basel Committee functions to set prudential regulation of banks and provides a
forum for cooperation on bank supervisory matters. 61 The Committee is located in Basel,
Switzerland, which is also where the committee's Secretariat has his home office, based in the
Bank for International Settlement...62 The goal of the Basel Committee is to promote global
financial stability by establishing minimum standards for prudential regulations on
supervision of banks.63 The standards are primarily directed at banks with an international
presence.64 The Committee focuses primarily on three aspects of effective banking
supervision: guidelines, sound practice, and implementation. Although there is no legal
force behind the standards the committee sets forth, it encourages the importance of a
66
convergence towards common standards. As such, membership in the Basel Committee is
voluntary and a number of countries have opted in to become members.
The Third Basel Accord or Basel III is the culmination of the Basel Committee's
most recent effort to set prudential regulation of banks.6 The purpose of Basel III is to
"strengthen the regulation, supervision and risk management of the banking sector." 69 Basel
III builds on the prior accord, Basel II, by trying to improve the banking sectors' ability to
absorb shocks from various financial and economic stresses, improve risk management and
banking oversight, and strengthen transparency and disclosure in the banking sector.
To accomplish these goals, Basel III focuses primarily on strengthening the global
capital framework.7 By first defining capital and then setting up a framework for risk
coverage, including a capital conservation buffer, countercyclical buffer, and leverage ratio,
Basel III seeks to address the need for financial stability and consumer protection.72
Basel III focuses on defining capital. Through a uniform definition, Basel III seeks
to prevent another crisis caused by an insufficient level of high quality capital. Basel III
6 See About the Basel Committee, BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, http://www.bis.org/about

(last visited Sept. 27, 2013).
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 See
Basel
Committee

Membership,

BASEL

COMMITTEE

http://bis.org/bcbs/membership (last visited Sept. 27, 2013).
6 The
Basel
Committee's
Work,
BASEL
COMMITTEE

ON

ON

BANKING

BANKING

SUPERVISION,

SUPERVISION,

http://bis.org/bcbs/bcbs work.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2013).
66 See About the Basel Committee, supranote 51.
Basel Committee Membership, supra note 54 (member countries include Argentina, Australia, Belgium,
Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg,
Mexico, the Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,
the United Kingdom and the United States).
See Basel III, supra note 5.
69 See Basel III, supra note 5, at 1.
7o Id.
7

See id. at 2.

72 See id. at 2-11.
73 See id. at 12.
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defines the elements of Capital as Tier 1 and Tier 2 Capital. In each of these Tiers, the
capital must be a certain percentage of risk-weighted assets.7 Risk-weighted assets are
defined as a bank's assets weighted according to the risk they carry.n These risk-weighted
assets are the ratio of capital a bank must hold relative to the amount of money it lends out.
Tier 1 capital consists of common equity Tier 1 and Additional Tier 1.79 Common Equity Tier
1 must be at least 4.5% of risk-weighted assets at all times.80 Tier 1 Capital must be at least
6.0% of risk-weighted assets at all times.81 Total Capital (Tier 1 and Tier 2) must be at least
8.0% of risk-weighted assets at all times. 82 Common Equity Tier 1 capital is the most resilient
type of capital. 8 3
Additionally, Basel III emphasizes that common shares are the primary instrument
to absorb losses. 84 The next most effective instrument for absorption of losses is Additional

74 See id.
6

Id.
See id.

Risk Weighted Assets, INVESTOPEDIA.COM.,
(last visited Oct. 15, 2013).

http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/riskweightedassets.asp

See id.
79 See Basel III, supra note 5, at 12.

so Id.
1 Id.
82 Id.

83 Id. at 13.
Common Equity Tier 1 capital consists of the sum of the following elements: Common
shares issued by the bank that meet the criteria for classification as common shares for
regulatory purposes, stock surplus resulting from the issue of instruments included in
common equity Tier 1, retained earnings, accumulated other comprehensive income and
disclosed reserves, common shares issued by consolidated subsidiaries of the bank and
held by third parties that meet the criteria for inclusion in common equity Tier 1 capital,
and regulatory adjustments applied in the calculation of common equity Tier 1.
84 Id. at 14.
Criteria for classification as common shares for regulatory capital purposes: capital must
represent the most subordinate claim in liquidation of the bank, entitled to a claim on
residual assets that is proportional with its share of issue capital after all senior claims
have been repaid in liquidation, principal is perpetual and never repaid outside of
liquidation, the bank does nothing to create the expectation at issuance that the
instrument will be bought back, redeemed, or cancelled nor do the statutory or
contractual terms provided any feature which might give rise to such expectation,
distributions are paid out of distributable items, there are no circumstances under which
the distributions are obligatory, distributions are paid only after all legal and contractual
obligations have been met and payments on more senior capital instruments have been
made, it is issued capital that takes the first and proportionately greatest share of any
losses as they occur, the paid in amount is recognized as equity capital for determining
balance sheet insolvency, the paid in amount is classified as equity under relevant
accounting standards and it is directly issued and paid in and the bank cannot directly or
indirectly have funded the purchase of the instrument, the paid in amount is neither
secured nor covered by a guarantee of the issuer or related entity or subject to any other
arrangement that legally or economically enhances the seniority of the claim, it is only
issued with the approval of the owners of the issuing bank, and it is clearly and
separately disclosed on the banks' balance sheet.
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Tier 1 Capital. 8 The criterion for inclusion in Additional Tier 1 Capital is very similar to
Common Equity Tier 1 Capital. The final and less resilient type of capital is Tier 2 Capital.
The criterion for inclusion in Tier 2 Capital is more relaxed than the requirements for capital
that has greater loss absorbing potential.88

Id. at 15.
Additional Tier 1 Capital consists of the sum of the following elements: instruments
issued by the bank that meet the criteria for inclusion in Additional Tier 1 capital and are
not included in common equity Tier 1, stock surplus resulting from the issue of
instruments included in additional Tier 1 capital, instruments issued by consolidated
subsidiaries of the bank and held by 3 d parties that meet the criteria for inclusion in
additional Tier 1 capital and are not included in common equity Tier 1, and regulatory
adjustments applied in the calculation of additional Tier 1 capital.
6 Id. at 15-17.

Criteria for Inclusion in Additional Tier 1 Capital: issued and paid in, subordinated to
depositors, general creditors and subordinated debt of the bank, is neither secured nor
covered by a guarantee of the issuer or related entity or other arrangement that legally or
economically enhances the seniority of the claim, is perpetual, may be callable at the
initiative of the issuer only after a minimum of five years, any repayment of principal
must be with prior supervisory approval, dividend and coupon discretion, dividends and
coupons must be paid out of distributable items, the instrument cannot have a credit
sensitive dividend feature, the instrument cannot contribute to liabilities exceeding assets
if such a balance sheet test forms part of national insolvency law, instruments classified
as liabilities for accounting purposes must have principal loss absorption through either
conversion to common shares at an objective pre-specified trigger point or a write down
mechanism which allocates losses to the instrument at a pre specified trigger point,
neither the bank nor a related party over which the bank exercises control or significant
influence can have purchased the instrument, nor can the bank directly or indirectly have
funded the purchase of the instrument, the instrument cannot have any features that
hinder recapitalization, if the instrument is not issued out of an operating entity or the
holding company in the consolidated group proceeds must be immediately available
without limitation to an operating entity.
Id. at 17.
Tier 2 Capital consists of the sum of the following elements: Instruments issued by the
bank that meet the criteria for inclusion in Tier 2 capital and are not included in Tier 1
capital, stock surplus resulting from the issue of instruments included in Tier 2 capital,
instruments issued by consolidated subsidiaries of the bank and held by third parties that
meet the criteria for inclusion in Tier 2 capital and are not included in Tier 1 capital,
certain loan loss provisions and regulatory adjustments applied in the calculation of Tier
2 capital.
Id. at 18-19.
Criteria for inclusion in Tier 2 Capital: instruments must be issued and paid in,
subordinated to depositors and general creditors of the bank, neither secured nor covered
by a guarantee of the issuer or related entity or other arrangement that legally or
economically enhances the seniority of the claim, maturity, may be callable at the
initiative of the issuer only after a minimum of five years, the investor must have no
rights to accelerate the repayment of future scheduled payments except in bankruptcy or
liquidation, the instrument cannot have a credit sensitive dividend feature, neither the
bank nor a related party over which the bank exercises control or significant influence
can have purchased the instrument, if the instrument is not issued out of an operating
entity of the holding company in the consolidated group proceeds must be immediately
available without limitation to an operating entity.
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Basel III also sets forth additional capital requirements such as the capital
conservation buffer. 89 The purpose of this buffer is to ensure that banks build up capital
buffers outside periods of stress that can be drawn down as losses are incurred. 90 When
buffers have been drawn down, banks are encouraged to reduce discretionary distributions of
earnings, such as bonus payments. 91 The 2.5% capital conservation buffer, which comprises
Common Equity Tier 1, has been established above the regulatory minimum capital
requirements.92
93
Another regulatory instrument proposed by Basel III is the countercyclical buffer.
Basel III takes notice that losses incurred in the banking sector can be extremely large when a
downturn is preceded by a period of excess credit growth.94 The purpose of the
countercyclical buffer is aimed to ensure that capital requirements take account of the macrofinancial environment in which banks operate. 9 5 This buffer consists of 0-2.5% of riskweighted assets, depending on the regulatory institutions' judgment as to the extent of buildup
of system wide risk.96
IV.

FAILURE OF BASEL II

The need for more specific banking regulations to promote financial stability arose
out of the failure of Basel II. The goal of Basel II was to "produce risk-based capital
requirements that are more risk-sensitive than those produced under the agencies' existing
risk-based capital rules." 97 To facilitate this goal, the Federal Reserve adopted an "advanced
internal ratings-based approach (IRB).98 The IRB approach used the banks' internal system to
calculate the banks' credit risk capital requirements.9 9 This approach required banks to
establish risk-based capital requirements, and to maintain a minimum risk-based capital ratio
requirement.1oo These ratios consist of the different types of capital, collectively known as
total qualifying capital, which consist of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital.101 These assets are then
weighed against the risk a bank carries to determine whether minimum risk-based capital ratio
requirements have been met. 102 Total qualifying capital was the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2

Id. at 54.
9 Id. at 55.
91 See id.
92 Id. at 56.

9 See id. at 57.
94

Id.

at 57-59.

95 See id.

Id.

at 58.
Risk-Based Capital Standards: Advanced Capital Adequacy Framework - Basel II, 72 Fed. Reg. 69288-01
(Dec. 7, 2007).
96
97

98 Id.

99 See id.

.ooSee id.
Id "The risk-based capital ratio requirements consist of 4% Tier 1 capital to total risk weighted assets and a
minimum of 8% total qualifying capital to risk weighted assets."
1o1

102 See id

311

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2014

9

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 5
THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS & LAW

capital elements. 103 By using their internal ratings-based approach, banks would establish the
risk weight of securitized assets through external rating agencies. 10
However, the failure of Basel II was caused by more than its capital ratio
requirements alone. Basel II lacked a capital conservation buffer as well as a countercyclical
buffer. 10 The purpose of the capital conservation buffer is to ensure that banks are
consistently preparing for economic downturn by building up capital buffers in times of
economic growth.1 06 The countercyclical buffer is designed to increase the amount of capital
required during times of economic expansion and decrease when there is economic
contraction. 10 The goal of the countercyclical buffer is to allow a bank to operate efficiently
by anticipating changes in the economic cycle.108 The lack of these buffers under Basel II
created undercapitalized banks, which were not prepared for the economic contraction created
by the home lending market. As a result, banks were unable to offset their losses and were
forced to take on more debt than available capital. 109 This directly led to the U.S. financial
crisis of 2008, something Basel III seeks to prevent through the addition of these buffers. 10

V.

RESPONSE TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS -DODD-FRANK

The purpose of Dodd-Frank is to prevent another financial crisis by focusing on the
"accountability and transparency" of the financial system so that consumers will not be
subject to abusive or deceptive financial practices.1 One way the Act sets out to accomplish
this purpose is through improving the regulation of bank and savings association holding
companies and depositary institutions. 1 12 The power to regulate banks has been explicitly
granted to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.113
Provisions in Dodd-Frank regarding banking regulation are limited, primarily
focusing on defining financial institutions and describing lending limits associated with such
institutions. To the extent banking regulation is discussed in the Act, capital regulations are
required to be countercyclical, which requires banks to increase their capital reserves when
the economy is doing well, while allowing banks to decrease these reserves when the
economy is contracting.1 1 5 Therefore, to correctly analyze whether the Federal Reserve's
Implementation of Basel III properly addresses the requirements set forth in Dodd-Frank, it is
prudent to examine provisions related to the underlying cause of the 2008 Financial Crisis 16
mortgage lending.1
103

Id.

'

Id.
See id.

1os
1o6

See Basel III, supra note 5, at 54.

107 Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 240.

10 See Regulatory Capital Rules, supra note 4, at 15.
109 See ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 8, at 24-25.

110 See Basel III, supra note 5.
See Dodd-Frank,supra note 1.
112 Dodd-Frank, supra note
1, at 221,
113 12 U.S.C. § 3902 (2012).
114 See Dodd-Frank,supra note 1 at, 102.
11 Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 240.
116 See id. at 761.
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The Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act seeks to reform the lending
process to promote the financial stability of the United States by defining mortgage
originators and setting forth requirements for every mortgage transaction." For example, one
primary source of profits for a bank is consumer home lending. 18 By lending out money, a
bank is constantly changing its risk-weighted capital. 119 As a consequence of this, an
examination of the reforms to mortgage practices is essential to determine whether the
Federal Reserve's implementation of Basel III is in-line with the requirements of Dodd-Frank,
and whether the capital requirements are proper in light of the mortgage reform.
Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act
The purpose of the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act is to protect
borrowers from unreasonable or complicated mortgage terms that do not properly reflect the
borrower's ability to repay the loan. 12 0 The Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending
Act seeks to accomplish this by regulating the issuance of credit while ensuring that credit is
available for qualified consumers. 1 2 1 The fundamental requirement prescribed by the Act
through residential loan origination standards is that all loan originators are qualified,
licensed, and registered.122 By keeping track of those who assist a consumer in obtaining a
residential mortgage loan, this Act attempts to prevent predatory lending by people and
institutions that hold themselves out to be "creditors" but lack the necessary supervision to
protect consumers and the economy from subprime lending practices.123
Additionally, this Act prohibits loan originators from receiving any fees as
compensation that are based on the terms of the loan.124 By doing so, this Act essentially
discourages lenders from using deceptive and unfair practices to direct borrowers into buying
products that may not be financially responsible, simply because there is a greater fee
available to the originator for that specific product. As an added security measure, the Act
imposes damages on the mortgage originators for violating these rules.125 The potential
damages include the greater of actual damages or an amount equal to three times the total
126
amount of compensation received by the originator, plus reasonable attorney's feeS.
The Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act requires that every creditor
make a "reasonable and good faith" determination based on verified and documented
information that the consumer has a reasonable ability to repay the loan, including the
principal, interest, taxes, and insurance.127 This requires a creditor to examine the borrower's
credit history, current income, reasonably expected income, current obligations, debt to

117Id.

11 See ANATOMY

OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 8, at 17.

id
120 Dodd-Frank, supra note
1, at 764.
121 Id.
119 See

122
123
124
125
126
127

Id.
See id
Id.
Id. at 766.
Id.
Id.

at 767.
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income ratio, employment status, and other real property held by the borrower. 12 8 The creditor
is required to look at not only the loan being originated, but also any additional loans the
borrowers may have to determine his or her ability to repay the loan. 129 By requiring creditors
to follow these guidelines, the Act seeks to prevent lending to borrowers that cannot repay
their obligations.
Income verification is the backbone of this process.130 To verify income, lenders are
required to review a borrower's W-2s, tax returns, payroll receipts, financial institution
records, and other third-party documents that are being relied upon to determine creditworthiness. 131 This verification process protects the lender and the consumer by providing a
reliable indication of the consumer's ability to repay the particular product he selected, taking
into account all other obligations the consumer may have. This establishes the borrower's
debt-to-income ratio (DTI). Most banks now requires that borrowers have a DTI that is equal
to or less than 36%, while the Government Sponsored Entities require a DTI equal to or less
than 45% for qualified mortgages.

132

One of the major factors that contributed to the financial crisis of 2008 was a lack of
properly appraised properties.133 The Act combats the use of subprime lending by regulating
appraisal activities. 134 The purpose of an appraisal is to verify that the loan amount is
appropriate to the value of the property. Part of the reason that RMBSs lost their value was
due to incorrect evaluation of home values, leading to mortgages that were in excess of the
property's value. 1 35 Therefore, when a borrower foreclosed on his property, a lender could not
recover the full amount of the mortgage by selling the property, resulting in large losses. The
Act now requires an appraisal to be conducted on every "higher-risk mortgage."1 3 6 This
definition essentially includes every residential mortgage that is originated by the lender. 1 3 7
Appraiser independence and unbiased judgment are important factors used to ensure
the validity of a property's value. 13 8 Appraiser independence, which is regulated by the
Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP), requires that appraisers
comply with independence requirements, making sure there is no conflict of interest or
anything that would influence the appraiser to incorrectly value a property. 139 The value that

12 Id.

at 768.

129See id. at 767.
130See id. at 768.
'31

Id.
132See generally Underwriting Training and Education Resources, FREDDIE MAC (Sept. 2013), available at
http://www.freddiemac.com/learn/pdfs/uw/underwriting resources.pdf [hereinafter UnderwritingResources].
133 See ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 8, at 15.

134 Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 810.
135See generally UnderwritingResources, supra note 122.
136 Dodd-Frank, supra

note 1, at 810.

137 Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 812.
[D]efining a higher-risk mortgage as:
one with an annual percentage rate (APR) that exceeds the average prime rate by 1.5% in
the case of first lien mortgage that does not exceed the maximum principle loan amount;
2.5% in the case of a first lien mortgage that does exceed the maximum principle loan
amount; and by 3.5% for subordinate lien mortgages.
138 See id
139 Id. at 813.
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the appraiser determines is then used in the underwriting process to screen for red flags, such
as property flipping and misrepresentation by the current owners of the property. 14 0 The
appraisal is also an effective tool for lenders to determine the risk associated with recouping
an outstanding mortgage as a result of foreclosure.141
Although these are all potential solutions to prevent subprime lending, the greater
problem remains - the banks' ability to sell off all qualified loans to Government Sponsored
Enterprises (GSEs). 142 The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) were chartered by Congress to
"ensure a reliable and affordable supply of mortgage funding."1 4 3 These GSEs work as a
secondary market for mortgages, where a lender can sell mortgages it originated, allowing for
"revolving liquidity" to originate more mortgages. 14 By 2004, the GSEs had purchased
$175,000,000,000 in subprime mortgages.145 From 2004 to 2007, this number increased to
$1,000,000,000,000.146 This was debt that lenders were no longer responsible for, but were
contributing to on a systematic basis.
The GSEs currently own or guarantee 75% of all newly originated mortgages and
own 13.3% of outstanding debt in the United States. 14 7 Additionally, they have issued RMBSs
for 31% of the residential debt market, a combined total of 44.3% of the outstanding

mortgage debt in the United States.148 As a result of the financial crisis, the Treasury
Department has agreed to purchase 79.9% of each GSEs common stock, potentially exposing
taxpayers to upwards of $5,300,000,000,000 worth of risk. 149 The function of the GSEs and
their continued purchase of loans originated by banks across the country is the issue that
should be addressed by Dodd-Frank and Basel III. To meet the goals of financial stability and
consumer protection, lending practices must be reevaluated, and a new framework, with more
accountability, should be developed.
VI.

FEDERAL RESERVE IMPLEMENTATION OF BASEL III

The Federal Reserve has substantially implemented Basel III as U.S. Domestic
Law. 150 The primary reason for implementing these rules was the insufficiency of high-quality
capital held by banking organizations to absorb the losses generated by the financial crisis in
2008. 1 The Federal Reserve seeks to clearly define the characteristics of regulatory capital
instruments.152 Consistent with Basel III, the Federal Reserve has determined the final
140See UnderwritingResources, supra note 122.
141 See id.

142 Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 830.
143

id.
See

Government

Sponsored

Enterprises,

FEDERAL

HOUSING

FINANCE

AGENCY,

http://www.fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=33 (last visited Jan. 02, 2014).
145 Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 830.
146 Id.
I47

Id.

148 Id.
149 Id.

at 831.

150 See generally Regulatory Capital Rules, supra note 4.
1 See Regulatory Capital Rules, supra note 4, at 93.
152 See id.
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minimum capital ratios of common equity Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets of 4.5%; a
ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets of 6%; a ratio of total capital to risk-weighted
assets of 8%; a ratio of Tier 1 capital to average total consolidated assets of 4%; and an
additional requirement for banks that the ratio of Tier 1 capital to total leverage exposure be
at least 3%.153
Additionally, the rule applies a capital conservation buffer equal to 2.5% of riskweighted assets above the minimum risk-based capital ratio requirements, which could be
expanded by a countercyclical buffer.154 The countercyclical buffer would initially be set at
0% and could expand to as much as 2.5% of risk-weighted assets. 1 55 The rule also applies a
4% minimum leverage ratio requirement to all banking organizations and eliminates
exceptions for banking organizations with strong supervisory ratings.1 56 Furthermore, by
defining regulatory capital components, the rule is designed to create specific guidelines to be
used in calculating risk-based capital ratios.
However, these definitions for risk-weighted
assets and guidelines for calculating capital ratios do not take into account lending
practices. 1 8 As a result, these regulations do not address the goal of financial stability.
VII.

THE ADOPTION OF BASEL III BY THE FEDERAL RESERVE DOES NOT
PROPERLY ADDRESS THE NEED FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION AS SET FORTH IN DODD-FRANK.

There is a substantial need for people to have the ability to obtain mortgages. 1 59 For
example, as of 2009, there were 76,428,000 total mortgages outstanding. 160 Further, in 2010,
there were a total of 116,716, 292 households in the United States. Looked at another way,
over 65% of homeowners own their homes with a mortgage attached to it. For this reason,
lending remains a primary concern for banks, government organizations and, more
importantly, borrowers.162 As a result of the financial crisis of 2008, almost every household
was affected in some way.163 The majority of affected mortgages were owned by major
financial institutions, with an outstanding mortgage debt ownership of $4.8 billion by 2007;

153 Id. at 85.
154

Id.

1

Id.

1

Id.

157 See id.
151 See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. & OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER
OF CURRENCY NEW CAPITAL RULE: COMMUNITY BANK GUIDE (July 2013) P,
available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/basel/files/capital rule community bank guide_20130709.pdf.
159 See generally Mortgage Characteristics-Owner Occupied Units: 2009, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2012),

available athttp://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0998.pdf.
160 Id.
161 See
Households and Families: 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (April

2012), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-14.pdf.
162 See supra note 149; See also id.
163 See U.S. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES
(Jan. 2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf.
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while the GSEs owned a significantly smaller portion, totaling $562 million. 16 4 Today, there
are various programs encouraging homeowners to refinance their homes; offering assistance
in the form of mortgage products that do not require a borrower to provide financial
statements or proof of income. 165 Additionally, the Government is actively seeking to provide
borrowers with essential information relating to refinancing, to encourage home lending. 6 6
As a general policy matter, the Government has been proactive in the way it has
addressed lending concerns.167 After all, there is a total outstanding mortgage debt totaling
over $13 billion.16 8 Through the GSEs, concrete guidelines have been put in place for lenders
to follow when evaluating a borrower's ability to pay. 169 The guidelines include the
evaluation of collateral, credit, income and assets, and mortgage insurance in an effort to
prevent subprime lending. 170 However, one of the major factors these guidelines fail to
address is long-term performance in light of unemployment rates and job security concerns.
1
Although the unemployment rate has decreased dramatically since early 2009, it is still
high, with some industries affected more than others. 172 Additionally, it is important to note
that the unemployment rate does not reflect those people who are no longer actively looking
for work.173 For lending guidelines to be effective, factors such as the unemployment rate, job
security, and industry growth should be included in the underwriting framework. 174 By
placing a greater emphasis on the borrower, overall lending risk can be decreased. 7
However, one problem still remains; the ability for banks to circumvent capital conservation
requirements by selling off loans they originate to the GSEs.1 76

'
See June 2007 StatisticalSupplement Mortgage Debt Outstanding,THE FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, (July
2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/supplement/2007/06/tablel_54.htm
[hereinafter
Mortgage Debt 2007].
16 See
generally Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP), MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE,

http://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/programs/lower-rates/Pages/harp.aspx (last visited Jan. 24, 2014).
See generally The Plan to Help Homeowners, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/refi (last
visited Jan. 24, 2014).
16 See March 2013 Statistical Supplement Mortgage Debt
Outstanding, THE FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD,
(March 2013), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/releases/mortoutstand/current.htm
[hereinafter MortgageDebt 2013].
16 Id.
169 See generally UnderwritingResources supra
note 122.

170See

id.
See id.
172 See Labor Force Statisticsfrom the CurrentPopulation Survey, BUREAU
OF LABOR STATISTICS (Jan. 2014),
available at http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS 14000000 (reflecting unemployment rates as high as 10% from
2009-20 10, and dropping down to 6.7% by Dec. 2013).
173 See How the Government Measures Unemployment, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Feb.
2009), available
at http://www.bls.gov/cps/cps htgm.pdf.
174 See generally O*Net, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, http://www.onetonline.org/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2014)

See UnderwritingResource supra note 122.
See Regulatory Capital Rules, supra note 4, at 17.
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VIII.

BASEL III CANNOT ADDRESS THE PROBLEM

A. Current State of banking regulation and the economy
The implementation of Basel III has constricted the banks' ability to lend money by
setting standards for defining capital and attaching a risk-weighted ratio to different forms of
capital with which the banks work. Additionally, by removing Tier 3 capital and adding on
an additional capital conservation buffer of 2.5%, as well as a countercyclical buffer with a
range of 0% to 2.5%, the Federal Reserve seeks to prevent banks from being illiquid in times
of financial downturn. 17 However, this enhanced risk coverage does not take into account
lending, which is the greatest risk endeavor a bank can undertake.179 After a bank originates a
loan, it is sold in the secondary market. 1so The GSEs are the largest purchasers of home loans
in the country. 1s1 GSEs will guarantee all mortgages up to a certain dollar amount; $417,000
for most of the nation and $625,000 in certain high cost areas.182 The stated purpose of the
GSEs is to ensure that "lenders have mortgage money to lend."1 8 3
As of the third quarter of 2013, there is over $13 billion of outstanding mortgage
debt.184 Banks and similar financial institutions currently own $4.3 billion, while the GSEs
own close to $5 billion. The majority of loans any bank will own, rather than sell off to a
GSE, inevitably carry less risk. 1 The underwriting guidelines in place have been established
by the GSEs and are designed to assist banks with the origination process to help reduce the
risk associated with loans the GSEs purchase from the banks.
As a result, banks are free to
set their own underwriting standards for loans that do not conform to the criteria established
by the GSEs.1ss This leads to a result where banks can dramatically decrease lending risk by
setting stricter underwriting guidelines.189 While GSEs require a maximum debt to income
ratio of 45% to approve a loan, certain banks list a maximum debt to income ratio of 36% on
their websites.190 For other types of loans, such as those that exceed the purchasing limits of
the GSEs, banks can require even stricter standards. 191This allows banks to actively manage
their risk and choose how much debt to hold, circumventing capital conservation

See id. at 19.
See id. at 85; see also Basel II, 72 Fed. Reg. 69288-01 (Dec. 7, 2007).
179 Supra note
0'

87

See id.
See Mortgage Debt 2013, supra note

182 See About Freddie Mac, supra note
7.
1'

15 7.

See id.

14 See Mortgage Debt 2013, supra note 157.

Id.
See generally UnderwritingResources, supra note 122.
See id.
See id.
189 See
Applying for
a Loan,
BANK
OF
AMERICA,
https://www.bankofamerica.com/homeloans/mortgage/applying-for-a-loan/how-mortgages-are-approved.go (last visited Jan. 24, 2014) (listing a
maximum DTI of 36%).
190 See National UnderwritingSummary, Mortgage Guarantee Insurance Company (Dec. 2, 2013), available at
http://www.mgic.com/pdfs/71-42978 uw_summary current.pdf.; See also id.
191See generally UnderwritingResources, supra note 122.
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requirements.192 Basel III does not take this framework into account and thereby, cannot
adequately address the goals of financial stability and consumer protection which Dodd-Frank
advances.
Current underwriting guidelines require an assessment of a number of factors when
approving a loan that will be later bought by a GSE.1 93 The first factor, collateral, requires an
underwriter to review an appraisal of the property sought to be mortgaged, calculate a loan to
value ratio, and determine whether it conforms to GSE underwriting requirements. 194 Then,
through a review of a borrower's credit, including his income, assets, credit score and debts,
an underwriter determines the debt to income ratio.195 Taking these items together, the
underwriter must view the borrower's risk in its totality to determine whether the borrower
has an ability to pay.196 However, in this verification process, factors such as a borrower's
future earnings potential and job security are not considered.1 97 As a result, the risk allocated
for a conventional thirty-year mortgage does not extend to the entire life of the mortgage.198
Instead, it only goes as far as to consider the last two years of employment. Assuming that the
earning potential of the borrower will not change, this process can only reflect the ability of a
borrower to repay for two years going forward. 199
With over 1.2-million foreclosures at some stage of the process right now, it is
possible that current lending guidelines are not the best measure for a borrowers' ability to
repay a loan.2 00 At a current ratio of around 1.5%, the foreclosure rate accounts for roughly
$195 million of bad-debt that banks and GSEs have to account for. 2 01 Given that banks have
the ability to insulate themselves from loans that carry larger amounts of risk; it is safe to
assume that this loss has to be attributable to the GSEs.2 02 This leads to the question of
accountability. If the banks originated these mortgages using GSE guidelines, and later sold
the loans to the GSEs, it is necessary to determine which entity is accountable for the
resulting failure of a borrower to repay the loan.20 3 However, the reality is that both entities
carry their own share of the responsibility; a bank, by originating the mortgage, and GSEs, by
purchasing the mortgages on the secondary market.20 4 The potential solution to this problem
is to reevaluate lending guidelines and create a system that is more representative of the
borrower's ability to repay the loan. In turn this type of framework will promote financial
stability and adequately protect consumers.

192See id.
193See id.
194See id.
195See id.
196

See id.

197See id.
198See id.

199See id. (taking into consideration that if a person's income is verified for the prior two years - that is only
sufficient to conclude that the income will stay the same for the next two years).
200See
generally
National
Real
Estate
Trends
&
Market
Info,
REALTYTRAC,
http://www.realtytrac.com/statsandtrends (last visited Jan. 24, 2014).
201See Mortgage Debt 2013, supra note 157.
202 See id.

203See About Freddie Mac, supra note 7.
204See UnderwritingResources, supra note 122.
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B. Still a lack of accountability
The GSEs currently hold close to $5 billion of the mortgage debt in the country.20
This has been a dramatic increase from the $560 million they held in 2007.206 One of the
primary reasons for this ten-fold increase was the multi-billion dollar bail-out of banking
institutions.20 As a result, the United States has leveraged its policy of promoting lending
against the resiliency of the GSEs to carry the debt. 2 0 8 This "revolving door" system of
allowing banks to originate loans and then sell them off to GSEs, defeats the purpose of Basel
III as it has been adopted by the Federal Reserve.2 09 It follows that the Federal Reserve does
not adequately address the need for financial stability and consumer protection as set forth in
Dodd-Frank.210 Instead, this system allows for banks to categorically sell loans that carry
higher risk to GSEs, in turn, freeing up capital for additional lending. 21 1
While Basel III seeks to prevent banks from becoming illiquid by setting capital
conservation requirements through defining and calculating risk-weighted asset ratios, the
policy of the GSEs to "ensure that lenders have mortgage money to lend" undermines that
goal.2 12 This calls for a solution that promotes lending, while still taking into account longterm risk. There is no way to tighten the capital conservation requirements set by the Federal
Reserve without decreasing a bank's lending ability.213 Instead, by focusing more on the
borrower, through regulations that accurately evaluate a borrowers financial abilities, a
solution can be implemented that still allows banks to freely lend money; while ensuring that
the resulting mortgages will have sustainable, long-term performance, without increasing debt
to income or loan to value requirements. 214 As a result, the GSEs will be able to purchase
loans that carry less risk which will lead to a lower probability of the borrower defaulting.
C.

Need for more specific guidelines

The problem with current banking regulations and, in turn, lending practices, is the
lack of long-term risk assessment. The current system fails to account for what happens
215
during the lending process. Instead, it leaves risk guidelines to the government by allowing
GSEs to set the minimum standards required to approve a loan.216 As a result, banks are not
obligated to follow the highest standards for risk review.217 Banks are only required to make a
"good-faith effort" to ensure that the borrower has the ability to repay a loan2. The
205See Mortgage Debt 2013, supra note 157.
206 See id; see also Mortgage Debt 2007, supra note 154.
207See generally THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 153.
208See About Freddie Mac, supra note 7.
209 See
id
210 See Dodd-Frank,supra
note 1.
211

See About Freddie Mac, supra note 7.

212 See Regulatory Capital Rules, supra note
4, at 19; see also id

213 See Regulatory Capital Rules, supra note
4, at 78.
214 See UnderwritingResources, supra note 122.
215
216
217

See Dodd-Frank,supra note 1, at 764.
See UnderwritingResources, supra note 122.
See id

218 See Dodd-Frank,supra note 1, at 763.
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responsibility for a loan's performance subsequently falls onto the GSEs. 2 19 This occurs due
to the use of automated systems such as Loan Prospector to underwrite mortgages. 220 This
takes much of the underwriting process out of the hands of registered mortgage underwriters,
and instead puts it in the hands of a computer system that analyzes the risk of the collateral,
credit, and debt of a borrower. 2 2 1 Although the underwriter still has the responsibility to
review the information provided, automation makes the approval process for mortgages less
reliable.2 2 2
As a result of the subprime mortgage crisis, Congress passed Dodd-Frank.2 2 3 The
purpose of Dodd-Frank is to address the need for financial stability and consumer protection
by setting requirements that all financial institutions must follow. 224 Many of the
requirements deal with the treatment of consumers, requiring certain disclosures and
standards that organizations must adhere to. 225 Additionally, the Act sets requirements related
to mortgage lending, which focus on the borrower's ability to repay the loan and restricts the
226
issuance of certain high-risk loans.
However, it allows the Federal Reserve to institute
banking regulations in accordance with the Act.22 In response to the financial crisis of 2008,
the Federal Reserve adopted Basel III, which significantly tightened banking capital
conservation requirements as compared to those previously set by Basel 11.228 By instituting a
capital conservation buffer and a countercyclical buffer, the Federal Reserve aimed at
preventing financial institutions from taking on more risk than they can cover.229 However,
this current structure creates a disconnect between mortgage lending and capital conservation
requirements.
It has traditionally been the policy of the United States to promote home ownership.
230 This has been done by making mortgages available to borrowers seeking to purchase a
home. 231 The creation of the GSEs allowed for banks to have a continuous ability to lend
money by selling off loans they originated to the GSEs. 32 The problem with this scheme is
that it does not hold anyone accountable for the failure of a borrower to pay his or her
mortgage.23 3 Instead, this scheme allows for the GSEs to set underwriting guidelines to
evaluate risk, leaving the actual review in the hands of banking institutions through the use of
automated systems. 234 Once the bank approves the loan, sells it to the GSEs, and gets back its

219 See About Freddie Mac, supra note 7.
220 See Loan Prospector,FREDDIE MAC, http://www.loanprospector.com/welcome/
221

(last visited Jan. 24, 2014).

See id.

222 See About Freddie Mac, supra note 7.
223
224
225
226
227
228
229

See Dodd-Frank,supra note 1.
Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 763.
See Dodd-Frank,supra note 1.
Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 764.
See Regulatory Capital Rules, supra note 4, at 2.
See id. at 19.
See id.

230 See generally THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 156.
231See About Freddie Mac, supra note 7.
232

See id.
233See Dodd-Frank,supra note 1, at 763.

234 See About Freddie Mac, supra note 7.
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capital, it is no longer accountable for the loan.2 3 Now the success or failure of the borrower
to pay off the loan becomes the responsibility of the GSE.236 As a result, the bank effectively
circumvents the capital conservation requirements set by the Federal Reserve.237
It is unlikely that the loophole of the "revolving door" lending mechanism can be
completely closed. However, it is possible to change lending and regulatory requirements by
assigning accountability to ensure financial stability and consumer protection.238 An effective
way to do this would be to focus on the borrower and assess the borrower's risk through the
duration of the loan. This would not only require banks to be more diligent in assessing a
borrower's risk, but it would also ensure that the GSEs purchase quality mortgages that will
perform through the duration of the loan. In turn, there would be fewer foreclosures and banks
would be incentivized by the loan's positive performance to keep more profit generating debt.
The first task would be to establish a governing body that can address mortgage
lending concerns while understanding bank capital conservation requirements. This is
necessary to establish accountability, through the use of an enforcement entity. The second
task would be to establish new underwriting requirements. Although many of the
requirements can stay the same, there should be additional requirements which will assist in
239
determining the lifetime performance of the loan. One of the factors that should be included
in the risk assessment process is the borrowers earning potential. This would require banks to
examine not only the last two years of a borrowers employment, but go back as far as
reasonably necessary to establish a trend.240
Things the underwriter out to consider are a borrower's level of education, length of
past employment, and financial habits, such as regularly depositing money into a savings
account. By assigning numerical values to these data sets, it would be possible to create a
projection of the borrower's earning potential. Although a borrower's education level would
be a factor, it would not be a discriminatory factor because it would be taken together with all
the other data points. For example, if a borrower only finished high school, but owns a
successful business, it would balance out the data points to create a true value of earning
potential.
Another factor that should be included in the risk assessment process is job security.
Again, there should be a number of data sets. These data sets, however, would reflect industry
performance in the locale of the borrower. 241 By analyzing industry performance and
projected growth, the lender could expand the borrower's likelihood of repaying the loan to
cover the entire duration of the loan. Although it would be difficult to predict how a particular
industry will do in the future, it would be helpful to analyze historical industry performance
and correlations to the unemployment rate in that industry. 4 2 By doing so, a true value can be
determined to represent the borrower's job security.

235 See id.
236 See id.
237 See Regulatory Capital Rules, supra note 4 (as soon as the bank sells of the loan, it no longer has
the need

to balance the debt against its capital).
238 See Dodd-Frank,supra note 1.
239 See UnderwritingResources, supra
note 122.
240 See
id.
241 See generally O*NET, supra
note 164.
242

See id.
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Taken together with the borrowers earning potential, these metrics would lead to
greater predictability of loan performance. These factors should not necessarily be given the
most weight. The current underwriting process calls for evaluating a borrower's income for
the past two years, current and pending debt, as well as total savings.243 These are all
important data points that must continuously be given significant weight.244 However, by
including the proposed factors in determining risk, a lender would have the ability to see past
the borrower's short-term risk and take into consideration potential future performance.
This helps solve the problems of accountability and capital conservation. It allows
for the Government to continue promoting its policy favoring homeownership. Additionally,
it acknowledges the fact that banks circumvent the capital conservation requirements set by
the Federal Reserve by selling their debt to the GSEs. 24 It also limits the risk of outstanding
mortgages owned by the GSEs by limiting the automation of the underwriting process,
instead creating an analytical framework that must be followed. By pegging industry
performance to a borrower's personal profile, this framework can help prevent foreclosures
and poor performance of mortgage instruments. Additionally, this framework would allocate
more accountability to the banks by forcing them to use more in-depth metrics to determine
loan performance. This stricter process for evaluating loans will also help increase consumer
confidence by assuring people that long-term risk has been taken into consideration, before
allowing a borrower to take on the substantial burden of mortgage payments.
This framework will help meet the goals of Dodd-Frank by addressing the need for
246
financial stability and consumer protection. It factors in the ability of banking institutions to
bypass the Federal Reserve's implementation of Basel III capital conservation
requirements. 247 Instead of allowing the GSEs to control the underwriting guidelines, it forces
banks to be responsible not only to the GSEs, but to borrowers and investors. Basel III alone
cannot take into account the need for lending and how the GSEs "revolving door" policy
affects a bank's capital conservation requirements.248 Nor can Dodd-Frank seek to protect the
public from another subprime mortgage crisis without taking into account the risks of lending.
By creating a framework that takes both Basel III and Dodd-Frank into
consideration and focuses on the borrower in combination with the lender, it is possible
promote financial stability and consumer protection.249 Financial institutions operating under
this framework will still have to meet the capital conservation guidelines set forth by Basel
III. However, they will no longer receive "blank checks" from the GSEs to maintain their
capital conservation requirements. Instead, they will have to address the true purpose of
Dodd-Frank by ensuring that borrower has the means and opportunity to repay his or her
loans. This will protect the GSEs from taking on bad debt and provide for long-term financial
stability.

243See UnderwritingResources, supra note 122.
244

See id

245See Regulatory Capital Rules, supra note 4, at 19.
246See Dodd-Frank, supra note 1.
247See Regulatory Capital Rules, supra note 4 at 14.
248See AboutFreddie Mac, supra note 7.
249See Dodd-Frank, supra note 1.
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IX.

CONCLUSION

The adoption of Basel III by the Federal Reserve does not properly address the need
for financial stability and consumer protection as set forth in Dodd-Frank. Basel III fails to
take into account the impact lending has on banking regulations. Consumer lending is a
fundamental part of the modern economic market. Consumer lending, theoretically, should
lead to economic stimulus by increasing consumer spending. By not addressing the
fundamental problems associated with consumer risk, Basel III lacks the necessary protection
to prevent another financial crisis. Although Basel III does put an emphasis on bank
capitalization and the need for accounting risk-weighted assets, it does not do enough for the
long-term. Even if a bank is properly capitalized on paper, by continuing to lend money and
subsequently selling the loans to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the bank is still able to keep
the necessary ratios while having a "revolving door" of loan applications. It can be argued
that mortgage guidelines have become stricter and banks are no longer arbitrarily lending to
consumers who lack the necessary financial foundation, but that is not to say that these
mortgages are "prime."
The nature of the market in responding to regulations is too slow and cannot simply
be fixed by adopting Basel III as a result. If consumers lack job security and the mortgage
guidelines only require proof of current employment, it is a realistic problem that the
consumer may lack the funds to pay the mortgage at any point after getting approved for it.
With the mortgage being held by the GSEs, the bank is capable of lending more money, while
the GSEs have to answer for any "subprime" loans they have on their books. As a policy
matter, the lending guidelines cannot be too extreme, otherwise it will undermine the
"American Dream," but at the same time, just setting capital conservation requirements that
banks have to adhere to does not solve the long-term problem of the need for financial
stability and consumer protection. The Federal Reserve should put more emphasis on
controlling bank lending practices and monitoring the selloff of loans to other institutions.
Simply having a capital conservation buffer only gives banks an obstacle, not a permanent
barrier to another financial crisis.
A possible solution is to put more emphasis on the borrowers' earning potential and
job security by factoring in a number of risk factors to determine the performance of the loan
through its complete term. To ensure financial stability and consumer protection, lawmakers
must focus on the regulation of bank capital conservation requirements, true consumer risk,
industry performance and subsequent sale of the loan. The Federal Reserve's adoption of
Basel III cannot possibly address this need by simply focusing on capital conservation, and
therefore, cannot properly address the need for financial stability and consumer protection as
set forth in Dodd-Frank. Instead, keeping in mind the continued need for consumer lending,
the most effective solution is to focus on financial and banking reform through the mortgage
framework. This can be done by focusing on the borrowers risk through the lifetime of the
loan, and not just using a current snapshot of the borrower's financial security at the time the
loan is approved.
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